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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents Joseph B. Allman and seven other claimants 
were each respectively employed by certain of the appellants 
above. They are trade unionists affiliated with one of the 
Six Basic Crafts (A. F. of L.), employed in Utah's heavy con-
struction industry. 
Respondents were each awarded unemployment compen-
sation by virtue of 42-2a, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, for 
the week ending June 10, 1950. While the responsibility to 
sustain these awards falls upon the Unemployment Compen-
sation Division of the State Industrial Commission, the signifi-
cance and novelty of the proposition now before the court im-
pels this Brief to present the position of the respondents as 
members of organized labor. 
The question before the Court has lately obtained the 
attention of several State Supreme and Appellate Courts due 
mainly to labor disputes involving employment in the highly 
integrated automotive industry. 
To the recital of facts supplied by counsel for the appel-
lants and the Industrial Commission, these respondents detail 
the following statement of facts in their view of the evidence 
in the record: 
FACTS 
In excess of 5,000 Utah workmen were laid off as a result 
of the Associated General Contractors (hereinafter called A. 
G. C.) shutdown and lockout of their plants commencing June 
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2, 1950, after the incidence of the Paul (Ogden) and Barker 
(Salt Lake City) job strikes. (See Stipulation of facts, Para-
graph 10, Department's Exhibit 1, (T-7). 
After the notification of February 27, 1950, reopening the 
contract for wage negotiations, the Six Basic Crafts, through 
its authorized agent, R. S. Roberts, advised thirty to forty of 
the A. G. C. members individually the Unions' intention to 
bargain with the contractors (T-80). This statement of facts 
is at variance with appellants' recital of the same fact. (See 
their Brief, paragraph 2, page 8.) 
The unions, according to Mr. Roberts, considered them-
selves open at all times to bargain individually with the con-
tractors after the notification of February 27, 1950 (T. 81). 
Neither the Six Basic Crafts, nor its membership, ac-
quiesced in the proposition that the contractors considered a 
"strike against one, a strike against all" ( T-79) . 
The contractors association, through its general counsel, 
published in Salt Lake City newspapers their lockout strategy, 
(appellants' exhibit No. 8 (T-19) and by implication threaten-
ed their workers with a reprisal lockout if a strike occurred 
at a single A. G. C. construction. 
Previously in 1948, (T-78) under a similar A. G. C.-union 
agreement, when the Six Basic Crafts took action against less 
than all of the members to the contract, other A. G. C. mem-
bers did not treat such action a "strike against all" and re-
taliate by shutting down their plants ( T-79) . This policy was 
true also in 1947 with the cement finishers union, one of the 
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Six Basic Crafts (T-91, 92). The iron workers union, one of 
the Six Basic Crafts, notwithstanding their inclusion in the 
present so-called master agreement, continued to bargain an-
nually individually with A. G. C. (T-83) and in such cases 
A. G. C. did not take mass action, shut-down, against the iron 
workers or others of the Si~C Basic Crafts on such individual 
demands (T-83). 
Only on the Paul and Barker jobs were picket lines estab-
lished. No other A. G. C. plants were picketed. Only two 
pickets, employees of Barker and not a claimant herein, were 
engaged in picketing (T-82). 
The strike vote at the Paul and Barker jobs was super-
vised by th~ Industrial Commission of Utah and no strike vote 
was taken against any other A. G. C. job (T-86 and 87). 
The collective bargaining agreement in effect, provides: 
"Article IX. 
A. The term of this Agreement shall commence on 
the date first before set forth and shall continue 
until the first day of June, 1951, and for additional 
· periods of one year thereafter; provided, however, 
either party to the Agreement may by the following 
conditions open this Agreement June 1st, 1950 for 
wages only. Should either party desire to modify 
any portion or any of the terms hereof, it shall no-
tify the other party in writing of such desire, specify-
ing therein the terms or provisions which it desires 
to modify, the modifications requested and the new 
sections, if any, it desires included. Such notice 
shall be given on or before the first day of March, 
1951, or on or before the first day of March prior 
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to the end of any subsequent yearly extension 
hereof. If such notice be not given within such 
period of time, then this agreement shall automati-
cally renew itself for an additional period of one 
year as herein provided. Should the wage reopen-
ing clause be exercised by either pa,-ty for the year 
of 1950, it shall automatically render inoperative 
Article IV, Section F, if no agreement is reached by 
June 1, 1950." 
Article IV of the agreement provides: 
"F. It is the purpose and intent of the parties hereto 
that all grievances and disputes arising under this 
Agreement be settled in accordance with the pro-
cedure hereinabove set forth and that during the 
term of this Agreement, the Unions signatory 
hereto or in whose behalf this Agreement is made, 
shall not during the term hereof call or engage 
in, sanction or assist in, a strike against or slow 
down or stoppage of work of the Contractor, and 
that there shall be no stoppage of work by any 
party hereto for any reason. Unions will require 
its members to perform their services for the Con-
tractors on all work described herein when re-
quested by contractors to do so; and Contractors 
will not cause or permit any lockout of members 
of signatory Unions during the term of this Agree· 
ment." 
The collective bargaining agreement became effective as 
to the contractors only if the individual members of the asso-
ciation became signators to the agreement and any modifica-
tion as to wages required the signature and agreement of the 
individual members. (See Stipulation of facts, Paragraph 6, 
Defendants' Exhibit 1, (T-7). 
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THE ISSUE 
Did the Industrial Commission act in accordance with 
law in granting respondents unemployment compensation 
award for the week of June 10, 1950? 
ARGUMENT 
Answer to appellants' Point 1. ., 
The fact that the Six Basic Crafts recognized A. G. C. as 
an appropriate bargaining unit for its membership did not 
prevent the unions from taking legal concerted action against 
sin~le members after the association-wide negotiations reached ~1.· 
an tmpasse. ~ 
-~ Answer to appellants' Point 2. 
The respondents were not engaged in a "strike" such as 
to disqualify them from benefits within the meaning of the act. 
Point 3. 
Assuming for argument's sake that respondents were en-
gaged in disqualifying activities, the Utah Unemployment Com-
pensation Act eliminates such disqualification where the un-
employment is caused by an employer-created strike or lockout. 
All three propositions above are inter-related and will 
be argued as one. 
Appellants' Point 1 that all parties were legally bound to 
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recognize the bargaining unit until the expiration of the agree-
ment in June, 1951, is not persuasive. These respondents do 
not contend that the Paul and Barker strikes dissolved the bar-
gaining unit and because of such fact barred recognition of 
the A. G. C. unit. The respondents contend that after the 
impasse of June 1st on the wage question, the A. G. C. unit 
had broken down. Nothing in the contract precluded the em-
ployers from withdrawing from the unit, hence the unions 
were permitted to bargain with the individual employers sep- · 
arately. From the facts recited earlier in this Brief (Pages 
5, 6, and 7) there was ample precedent for individual em-
ployer bargaining. Each of thirty to forty individual con-
tractors received notification of the reopening for wage talks 
February 27, 1950, and in the past, (See pages 5, 6, and 7, 
this Brief) whenever mass bargaining had broken down and 
individual bargaining occurred never did A. G. C. treat such 
incidents with lockout reprisal. Furthermore, b~fore any 
member of the association was bound to the contract or any 
modification to it he would have to sign the agreement indivi-
dually. The Labor Committee of A. G. C. required either 
power of attorney or individual signature of its members. 
The point we make is this: Granted that A. G. C. was 
an appropriate bargaining unit for association-wide negotia-
tions, it was not the only appropriate unit. 
After the impasse separate negotiations were not only 
permitted, but in the logic of the times, desirable. The author-
ity of A. G. C. must be limited to association-wide negotiations. 
If separate negotiations are not permitted, the impasse would 
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almost always either widen and prolong industrial strife or 
necessarily deprive the unions of their right to take legal con-
-certed action against all but the entire industry. 
It is conceded that rulings of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, a federal quasi-judicial administrative agency, do 
not constitute judicial authority. They are, however, entitled 
to be given some weight because that Board is charged with 
. the administration of a national labor relations act and has 
' 
undoubtedly, developed some familiarity with the legislative 
history of both national and state labor policy. 
The recent decision of the National Labor Relations 
Board in the case of Morand Brothers Beverage Co., September 
25, 1950, 91 NLRB 58, applies the correct rationale to the 
issue now before the court. 
In that case, the employer was charged with an unfair 
labor practice under the National Labor Relations Board Act 
interfering with union activity. The facts were, since 1943 a 
local union had bargained with the employers' association on 
behalf of· the salesmen. In March 1949, after unsuccessful 
negotiations for a new contract, the local sent directly to each 
employer for signature the same contract that had been pro-
posed to the joint committee which represented all the em-
ployers. No employer accepted the contract, and joint nego-
tiations were resumed. . After another impasse was reached, 
the union called a strike limited to one employer. On the fol-
lowing day, the other employers in the association sent their 
salesmen a letter stating that it was the union's intent eventual-
ly to call a strike against every employer in the association. 
10 
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The letter then requested the salesmen to turn over their 
records and settle their accounts. This was construed as a 
discharge. 
The Board found.that the employees had been discharged, 
not just laid off pending settlement of the contract. It ex-
pressly refused to decide whether a layoff would have been 
proper. It held that the discharge of the striking employees 
was illegal, as an attempt to penalize them for striking and 
thus discourage future concerted activity. Discharge of non-
striking employees was also held to be discriminatory, in that 
it was a reprisal either against a possible future strike or 
against a strike by other members of the same union against 
one employer. 
The argument that the discharges were defensive meas-
ure to protect the association members from strikes by the 
union against the employers, one by one, was rejected. The 
Board held that an employer's economic interest in preventing 
a successful strike did not justify conduct proscribed by the act. 
It pointed out that a contrary view, if applied, would permit 
the widening of industrial strife, while the purpose of the act 
was to prevent it. If the policy ·defended by the association 
were permitted, a one-employer strike could be converted into 
an industry-wide dispute; and since discharge of strikers for 
strike activity is illegal, a union, in its turn, would be en-
couraged to strike all or none of the employers. 
Member Reynolds dissented from this conclusion. He 
stated that the employers' action constituted a lockout or lay-
off rather than a discharge, as shown by their failure to resume 
11 
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operations or replace the employees; and that there was no 
background of anti-union activity on the part of the employers. 
The Board also ruled that the union's strike against one 
employer and its attempt to enter into• separate negotiations 
with that employer did not constitute restraint or coercion in 
the selection of bargaining representatives under Section s 
(b) ( 1) and (B) , of the National Labor Relations Act. There 
was insufficient evidence, the Board held, that this employer 
had designated the joint committee as its bargaining agent for 
separate negotiations, as well as for association-wide negotia-
tions. Neither was there evidence, it held, that the union 
would have rejected the joint committee as the employer's 
representative in separate negotiations. The strike was not 
an attempt to coerce the employer to resign from the associa-
tion, the Board held; nor were the union's proposals to the 
various employers for separate negotiations a refusal to bargain. 
It was pointed out that, since an employer could withdraw 
from a multi-employer unit, a union should also be permitted 
to bargain with individual employers separately after negotia-
tions with the larger unit had broken down. Furthermore, the 
Board held, even if the association were the only appropriate 
unit, the union was not required to bargain with all employers 
simultaneously or to negotiate the same contract with all. 
While admitting that in the first instance, the union was 
obliged to bargain with the association rather than with sepa· 
rate employer members, the Board stated that, after an impasse 
had been reached, separate negotiations were permissible. Such 
separate negotiations, it pointed out, were not shown to pre-
12 
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elude simultaneous association-wide negotiations. At any rate, 
it held the authority of the association was apparently limited 
to association-wide negotiations. The association, while an 
appropriate bargaining unit, was held to be not the only 
appropriate unit. 
Counsel for these respondents is aware that a contrary 
opinion was rendered in June, 1950, by Robert N. Denham, 
general counsel for the National Labor Relations Board. (See 
26 LRR 153). Mr. Denham refused to issue a complaint 
against employers who had ellegedly locked out their em-
ployees. The teamsters union struck only three dairies in 
a nine-member association in Washington, D.C., with which 
it had contracted in the past. When the other six dairies in 
the association closed down their operations, the union filed 
charges of discriminatory lockout with the general counsel and 
requested the general counsel to issue an unfair labor practice 
complaint. Air. Denham's reasons for rejecting the union's 
charge were "the employees of the nine dairies constitute a 
single unit for the purpose of collective bargaining and that 
a strike against any one or more of the dairies who collectively 
make up the employer group, becomes a strike against the 
entire organization and justifies all of the members of the 
employer group in exercising their full economic force to <;oun-
teract the economic force of the union represented by its 
strike call." 
The Morand case was decided after Denham's above 
opinion and since June, 1950 Mr. Denham has been replaced 
by a new general counsel. 
13 
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Attention is now called to Articles IX and IV F. of the 
Labor agreement pursuant to which it was legal for the union 
to take concerted action after an impasse had occurred on the 
wage talks; it is submitted that the fact that a labor agreement 
was in effect did not preclude the unions from taking legal and 
concerted action against single members. 
Answer to Appellants' Point 2. 
It is submitted that counsel for the Industrial Commission 
has properly briefed the law on the direct issue of respondents' 
entitlement for their awards. These respondents join in the 
Industrial Commission Brief and cases and arguments cited 
therein. 
Respondents contend that they were not unemployed due 
to a stoppage of work which existed because of a "strike" 
involving their grade, class or group of workers at the factory 
or establishment at which they were last employed. 
To rule otherwise would ignore the fact that the A. G. C. 
association constituted between forty to seventy individual 
and separate employer units, with separate business structures 
and payrolls, engaged in every kind of industrial construction 
throughout the State of Utah. Merely because these contractors 
bargained as a unit through an industrial association (A. G. C.) 
does not relate their businesses or make their establishments 
synonymous within the meaning of the act so as to disqualify 
these respondents. The contrary must have been intended by 
our legislature. The public policy declared to apply to our un· 
employment act is: 
14 
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"To prevent its (unemployment) spread and to 
lighten its burden which now so often falls with crush-
ing force upon the unemployed worker and his family.'' 
If appellants' contention is accepted, real violence is done to 
this policy by the mere act of employers pyramiding into in-
dustrial associations, becoming related to other employers 
through a chain of verbal connection, so that ultimately wher-
ever a trade dispute exists with any employer who is associated 
with other employers in such a pyramided structure, they 
could thus impair the full purpose of the act. 
The weakness of appellants' position is apparent from 
the fact that no contractor became bound to the agreement 
merely by his membership in A. G. C. The contractors' sig-
nature was required to the labor agreement. The Labor Com-
mittee of A. G. C. could not take economic action nor bind 
any member to a modification of the agreement on behalf of 
any single member who failed to acquiesce in its strategy or its 
negotiations. A. G. C. is a mere association and not an em-
ploying or multi-employing unit within the meaning of this 
act. It is conceivable that a single construction company might 
own and operate ten to fifteen integrated yet separate establish-
ments in their business structure throughout this State or several 
sates and a rrstrike" at one might disqualify workers of the same 
class at other establishments of that company. But merely 
because that construction company is a member of a trade as-
sociation with "X" company, who supplies it with products 
should not disqualify its employees if a strike were to occur 
at "X" company and eventually cause it to shut down because 
of short supplies. To make such separate companies and their 
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establishments synonymous merely because they belong to a 
similar trade association would defeat the purpose of our 
unemployment compensation act. 
The following cases, some of which have been cited in 
the Industrial Commission's Brief, may be of assistance to the 
Court in this problem: 
Nordling vs. Ford Motor Co., (1950) Minn., 42 NW 
2d 576 
Ford Motor Co. vs. Virginia Compensation Commis-
sion ( 1951), Virginia, 63 SE 2nd 28 
Bucko vs. Quest Foundry Co., Minnesota, 38 NW 
2nd 222 
Rhea Mfg. Co. vs. Industrial Commission, Wiscon-
sin, 285 NW 749 
Thomas vs. California Employment Stab. Commis-
sion, ( 1950) California, (District Court of Appeals), 
224 Pac. 2nd 411 
Almada vs. Commission ( 1951) Connecticut, 77 A 
2d 765 
Assif vs. Commission, Connecticut ( 1951) 77 A 2d 
772 
Machcinski vs. Ford Motor Co., (1951) N.Y. 102 
NYS 2d 208 
Burger vs. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review 
(1951) Pa. Super. 77 A 2d 737 
Point 3. 
Assuming for argument's sake that respondents were 
engaged in disqualifying activities, the Utah Unemployment 
Compensation Act eliminates such disqualification where the 
employment is caused by an employer-created strike or lockout. 
16 
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Section 42-2a-S provides: 
(2) "If the Commission, upon investigation, shall find 
that the employer, his agent, or representative, 
has conspired, planned or agreed with any of 
his workers, their agents, or representative to 
foment a strike, such strike shall not render the 
workers ineligible for benefits." 
It seems to these respondents the above sub-section can 
have one meaning, namely: That our legislature intended to 
eliminate the ineligibility disqualification based upon a work 
stoppage where the unemployment is proximately caused and 
due to an employer-created strike or lockout. 
In this case the ultimate and final act causing the unem-
ployment of the respondents and 5,000 other workers was the 
mass employer shut-down rather than any preliminary act 
which might have furnished a motive for the shut-down caus-
ing the unemployment. 
A lockout has been defined as: 
"To withhold employment from (a body of em-
ployees) as a means of bringing them to accept the 
employer terms." (See Webster's New International 
Dictionary, Second Edition, 1934). 
Our Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this proposition. 
The statutes of a few states specifically recognize unemploy-
ment due to a lockout as an exception to the disqualifications: 
Page's Ohio Gen. Code Ann. 1948 Supp. Section 
1345-6 (d) -
Kentucky Rev. St. 1948, Section 341.360 ( 1) 
17 
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Arkansas St. 1947 Ann. Section 81-1106 (d) (2) 
West Virginia 1947 Supp. to Code of 1943 Section 
2366 (78) (4) 
Connecticut-Ge~. ~t. _Re~. of 1949, Section 7508 (3) 
Gen. Laws of MlSSlSSlppl, 1944, C 288, Section 1 
M. S. A. (Minn.) Section 268.09 Sub 1 (a) (b) ( 1) 
U.S. 42 USCA, Section 1103 (a) (5) 
The case of McKinley vs. California Stab. Employment 
Commission, 209 Pacific 2nd 602, cited by appellant is based 
upon a California statute that contains no provision whereby 
the lockout acts to eliminate the disqualifications; the Minne-
sota case, Bucko vs. Quest Foundry Co., supra, is based upon 
a statute containing an express provision eliminating the dis-
qualification where unemployment is due to a lockout. See 
Almada vs. Commission ( 1951) Conn. 77 A 2d 765; Assif 
vs. Commission, ( 1951) Conn., 77 A 2d 772, and Burger vs. 
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (Pa. Super.) 77 A 2d, 
737. 
Once it is established that the unemployment is caused 
by the direct and proximate act of his employer's lockout, the 
exception to such disqualification should apply regardless of 
whether the employees are members of the same trade union 
which is engaged with other employers, members of the same 
trade association, in a labor dispute. The fact that these re-
spondents might receive an increase in wages as a result of 
the action taken against other employers, or that the appellants 
believe their employer anti-strike strategy warranted the lock-
out, should have nothing to do with the eligibility of these 
respondents for their unemployment compensation benefits . 
• These respondents have a vested interest in their entitlement 
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inasmuch as a portion of their weekly wage goes to pay the 
premium for which they receive this insurance. 
The Utah statute admittedly is not as specific on this 
point as the Minnesota law, but certainly indicates the intention 
of our legislature not to bar a claimant when unemployment is 
due to a lockout in no way the fault of the employee. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts here are clear that immediately following the 
legal strike of June 1, 1950, at the Paul and Barker jobs, the 
majority of the A. G. C. contractors, by a pre-arranged plan 
of strategy agreed to on 11ay 17, 1950, shut down and locked 
out in excess of 5,000 employees, of which these claimants 
were a class. The record is clear that these 5,000 claimants 
were willing to continue working at existing rates and there 
was work available. It cannot be said that their unemploy-
ment was due to a stoppage of work which exists because 
of a strike at the establishment at which they were last em-
ployed. 
This employee lockout was used as a weapon by the em-
ployers as a counterpart of the strike at the two jobs; the em-
ployer appellants certainly weighed all its aspects before using 
this tactic. 
If the lockout of these 5,000 workmen had continued, the 
economic and social well-being of the State could have been 
severely injured. The appellants created a mass unemployment 
situation and should not now be heard to complain, having 
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created it, that their unemployed workers were not entitled 
to minimum unemployment benefits. 
The respondents, as members of organized labor, do not 
ask for preferred treatment. They merely ask for their entitle-
ment under law. For the reasons cited herein and by the In-
dustrial Commission, we contend that the decision of the 
Industrial Commission was proper and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
2J 
A. W. SANDACK, 
Attorney for Respondents 
Joseph B. Allman, et al. 
1122 Continental Bank Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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